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1.INTRODUCTION
“Reciprocity is the key to every relationship”
(Danny DeVito in LA Confidential)
Almost all of economic theory is built on the assumption that people act selfishly and do not
care about the well-being of other human beings. Lots of recent evidence, however,
contradicts pure selfishness. For example, Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler (1986) show in a
seminal paper that consumers' opinions about price increases depend crucially on the costs of
the firm, but not on the market conditions—a price increase due to cost increases is regarded
as justified, while a demand shock is not a valid justification. Whereas Kahneman et al's
study deals with the fairness perception of consumers, experimental evidence suggest that
also actual behavior is shaped by factors inconsistent with pure selfishness. For example, in
ultimatum bargaining experiments people often reject allocations in which they receive a
much smaller monetary payoff then their partners in favor of an allocation where neither
player receives anything (see Roth (1995) for an overview). In gift exchange games, where
two persons in turn determine how large gifts to give to one another, people behave
reciprocally. A large gift by the first mover prompts a generous response (see Berg, Dickhaut
& McCabe 1995, Falk, Gächter & Kovacs 1997 and Fehr, Gächter & Kirchsteiger 1997). If
the size of the gift of the first player is determined on a double auction market, these gift
exchange forces are even strong enough to prevent the market from clearing (see Fehr,
Kirchsteiger & Riedl 1993, 1998).
These deviations from selfishness may have important economic consequences. As Fehr et al.
(1997) show experimentally the set of enforceable contracts increases considerably due to
non-selfish behavior. These effects are of particular importance for understanding labor
markets. In a series of theoretical papers Akerlof (1982) and Akerlof & Yellen (1988, 1990)
show that fairness is a possible explanation why wages may be above the market clearing
level so that involuntary unemployment occurs. Fehr & Kirchsteiger (1994) use this approach
to explain why two-tier systems are rarely observed in reality. Bewley (1995) finds strong
empirical evidence for the validity of these theories. When asked for the reason why wages
remain above the market clearing level in recessions, managers and other labor market2
participants say that wage declines may destroy "working morale"—workers would decrease
their working effort after a decline in wages which therefore cannot be enforced.
All this evidence suggests that people are not motivated solely by material self-interest. Also
considerations of altruism, emotions, fairness, et cetera play a role. Models designed to
capture some of these phenomena can be roughly divided into two classes: those that focus
on distributional concerns, and those that focus on a concern for reciprocity. The
distributional approach permits decision makers to be motivated not only by their own
material gain, but rather by the final distribution of the material payoff.
8 In Fehr & Schmidt
(1997), for example, it is assumed that for a given own material payoff a person's utility is
decreasing in the difference between the own payoff and that of the partner. They show that a
lot of experimental evidence can be explained by their theory which, furthermore, has the
advantage of being very close to standard models. There is, however, a certain cost. The
assumption that individuals care only about final distributions implies that they must be
indifferent concerning how distributions come about. This is problematic if in fact individuals
regard information about their co-players' specific choices or intentions as important to their
decision making.
9
Rabin (1993) convincingly argues that intentions play a crucial role when individuals are
motivated by reciprocity considerations. When a person wants to be kind to someone who
was kind to her, and unkind to unkind persons, she has to assess the kindness (or unkindness)
of her own action as well as that of others.
10 To do this she may have to look at the intentions
that accompany an action. Take as an example the game G1 in Figure 1 (with monetary
payoffs).
                                               
8 Examples of this approach are the models of Akerlof & Yellen (1980, 1990), Bolton & Ockenfelsfels (1997),
Fehr & Kirchsteiger (1994), Fehr et al (1998), Fehr & Schmidt (1997), Kirchsteiger (1994), and Levine (1997),
where in addition to distributional concerns persons are also motivated by the degree of altruism of the partner.
9 A related problem discussed in social choice theory concerns whether welfare assessments can be made with
reference to final distributions only. See Sen (1979) for a critical discussion.
10 A word of caution about terminology is in order. Some authors (for example Bolton & Ockenfels 1997)
distinguish between direct and indirect reciprocity, the former being a principle like the one we describe here
(and simply call "reciprocity") , whereas the latter is a pure concern for distributive justice.3
(Insert Figure 1)
Is F an unkind action? Clearly, this depends on what player 1 believes that player 2 will do.
Suppose player 1 believes that player 2 will choose d. By choosing F player 1 then intends to
give a payoff of 2 to player 2, whereas player 2 would get a payoff of only 1 if player 1 chose
D. Hence, one may conclude that player 1 acts kindly if he chooses F. By an analogous
argument, however, one must conclude that 1 is unkind if he chooses F while believing that 2
will choose f. This example shows not only that intentions are crucial in order to model
reciprocity; it also makes clear that intentions depend on the beliefs of the players.
Furthermore, the kindness of a player also depends on the possibilities he has. Change the
game of Figure 1 such that player 1's strategy set consists only of F—she has to "choose" F.
In such a game a "choice" of F is of course neither kind nor unkind—it is simply the only
thing that 1 can do. Hence, in order to model the impact of intentions one has to take into
explicit account both the possibilities and the beliefs of the players.
This is what Rabin (1993) does. Using the framework of Psychological Game Theory
(Geanakoplos, Pearce & Stacchetti, 1989), he assumes that the players in two-player normal
form games experience psychological payoffs in addition to the underlying material payoffs.
The former payoffs depend on the players' kindness. Given the belief of player i about the
strategy choice of the other player j, i regards himself as kind to the extent that he gives the
other player a high payoff. In a similar way the kindness i expects from j depends on i's belief
about j's strategy and on i's belief about what j believes about i's strategy choice, i.e. on a
second-order belief of i. Given these kindness assessments, Rabin models the psychological
payoff such that i wants to be kind to j if he believes j to be kind (as long as the material
payoff does not become too important for i). Notice that the kindness of i depends on his
belief about j's strategy. Hence, i's kindness depends on the payoff he intends to "give" to j,
compared to the payoffs he is able give him—intentions and possibilities define the kindness
of action. Therefore, the approach can model reciprocity. Furthermore, Rabin shows that a
redefiniton of the payoff functions does in general not lead to the same results as his
concept—since intentions matter, models of reciprocal behavior have to lead to different
results than an approach where beliefs are not allowed to affect payoffs directly.4
However, Rabin's model has a serious drawback that may restrict the potential for
applications of his approach. Since it is  a normal form concept it does not take into account
the sequential structure of a strategic situation. Since a "Rabin-equilibrium" is calculated
using the normal form, it may be that non-optimizing behavior is prescribed at information
sets that are not reached (like in usual game theory where in Nash equilibrium players do not
necessarily optimize off the equilibrium path). This lack of sequential calls for a modification
of Rabin's concept.
11 It turns out that there is then another problem which makes this more
complicated than in usual game theory. In sequential games players’ may revise their beliefs
as play unravels, and, since kindness depends on beliefs, the nature of reciprocity concerns
may have to be revised accordingly. Consider the "Sequential Prisoners Dilemma" game as
shown in Figure 2, which is is a stylized version of the experiments conducted by Fehr et al.
(1993, 1998).
(Insert Figure 2)
It can be easily shown that cooperation by player 1 (the choice C) and unconditional
cooperation by player 2 (i.e., the choice c at each node controlled by 2) form a "Rabin
equilibrium" (defined in the normal form of G2), as long as the the concern for material
payoffs does not overcome the concern for reciprocity.
 12 Unconditional cooperation of player
2, however, is very unplausible. Why should player 2 be kind after 1 took the unkind
action?
13
The problem arises because optimization is not mandated at 2's second node (which in the
equilibrium (C,cc) is not reached). However, solving this problem is not just a matter of
looking at the extensive game and mandating optimization at all nodes. After all, for 2 to
                                               
11 Rabin (1993, p 1296) himself notes that “[e]xtending the model to sequential games is also essential for
applied research”.
12 The problem we describe does not depend on the rather special kindness- and payoff-functions Rabin (1993)
uses. The same problems arise with the more generalized kindness functions he discusses in his Appendix A.
13 In the experiments by Fehr et al. (1993, 1998) such behavior was nearly never observed.5
choose c at her rightmost node may be in her interest if she conceives of 1 as kind. However,
it seems clear that even if 2 initially believes that 1 is kind, she should not maintain such a
belief after 1 chooses D. Rather she should then regard 1 as unkind, which would motivate
her to take revenge by choosing d.
The general upshot of this example is that a sensible model of reciprocity in sequential games
must with care handle how beliefs change and how this affects reciprocity considerations.
Incorporating such a "sequential reciprocity principle" is important in many potential
applications which have a non-trivial dynamic structure. For example, the game shown by
Figure 2, is a very stylized version of the Fair Wage Effort models of Akerlof and Yellen,
with the firm (player 1) making a generous or greedy wage offer and the worker (player 2)
deciding about providing a high or low working effort. Other examples are the ultimatum
bargaing games and the gift exchange games discussed above. Given the sequential structure
of these games and other potential applications, it is crucial to derive a concept of sequential
reciprocity. This is the main objective of our paper.
In order to highlight and isolate the consequences of sequential reciprocity, and in order to
facilitate a clearcut comparison with Rabin’s (1993) model, we focus exclusively on
incorporating a concern for reciprocity. We disregard distributional concerns. This is not to
say that such concerns are unimportant. In reality both motives seem to play a role.
14 We
hence regard the two approaches complementary.
In the next section we present our model and define the concept of a sequential reciprocity
equilibrium (SRE). In Section 3 we apply this concept to some well known games and we
show how the experimental results may be explained by our approach. In Section 4 we prove
an existence theorem concerning the concept of SRE. In Section 5 our approach is compared
in detail to Rabin's (1993) approach. Final comments conclude.
                                               
14  The experimental evidence on the importance of reciprocity vis-à-vis the importance of distributional
concerns is somewhat mixed. Whereas Bolton et al. (1996) find that only the final distribution matters,
Charness' (1996) results suggest that reciprocity as well as distributional concerns play a role. Outside
economics social psychologists have found strong experimental evidence of the importance of reciprocity,
stressing the important role played by intentions (see e.g. Goranson and Berkowitz 1966 or Greenberg and
Frisch 1972). Also anthroplogists and sociologists regard reciprocity as a main factor of human behavior, crucial
for the functioning of human societies. For an overview of this literature, see Komter (1996).6
2. THE MODEL
In the Introduction we argued that whether a person is kind or unkind depends not only on
what he does but also on what he believes will be the consequence of his decision, as
compared to what he believes would be the consequences of other decisions. Said differently,
a person’s kindness depends on his intentions. When another person wants to reciprocate
kindness with kindness, she must assess the first persons intentions. Hence in taking
decisions she will be motivated by her beliefs about the first persons intentions. Since
intentions depend on beliefs, it follows that reciprocal motivation depends on beliefs about
beliefs.
To come to grips with such issues, we work within the framework of psychological game
theory. Psychological games differ from standard games in that a player’s payoff depends not
only on what strategy profile is played, but possibly also on what is the player’s beliefs about
other players’ strategic choices or beliefs. The approach we use is inspired by Rabin (1993).
We start off with a standard game, which is viewed as a description of a strategic situation
which specifies only the material payoffs. We then derive a psychological game in which the
payoff functions are redefined so as to reflect also reciprocity considerations. The main
difference between our model and Rabin's is that he works with normal form representations
of strategic situations, while we work with extensive forms and impose a requirement of
sequential rationality.
15
When this is done, a subtle issue arises: If a subgame is reached, perhaps unexpectedly, this
may force a player to change his beliefs about the strategy profile being played. Since
kindness relates to beliefs, assessments about kindness may therefore change and affect the
ways in which a player is motivated by reciprocity concerns. It becomes necessary to
somehow distinguish between a player’s initial and subsequent  beliefs. We handle this by
keeping track of how the players’ beliefs change as any new subgame is reached, and by
assuming that whenever a player makes a choice he is motivated according to the beliefs he
holds at that stage. These assumptions are central to our model. We argued already in
                                               
15 There are also certain other less important differences between our model and Rabin’s, but we postpone a
discussion of these until Section 5.7
connection to G2 in the Introduction that if reciprocity is important one may get unreasonable
conclusions unless players are assumed to update their assessments of how kind their co-
player are as play unravels, and then reciprocate accordingly. However, this also means that
the psychological games we consider do not belong to the class of psychological games that
receives most attention in Geanakoplos et al (1989), as they confine attention to
psychological games where only initial beliefs have a direct bearing on players payoff
perception (although they suggest (p78) that other assumptions may be important).
We deal with extensive games without nature and with perfect recall. Any such game G is a
quintuple which specifies respectively the game tree, the player partition, the information
partition, the choice partition, and the assignment of payoffs to endnodes. We refer to
standard texts (for example van Damme (1991, Chapter 6)) for the general formalism of
extensive games and state only those basic and derived concepts we shall need. Given an
extensive game G, let R be the set of nodes that are roots of subgames, and 
r G  the subgame
of G which has rÎR as its root. Define the depth of a subgame as the number of its proper
subgames. Since we need to keep track of how the players’ beliefs change as new subgames
are reached, it is convenient to introduce the following new concept: Define the r-part of 
r G
as the set of vertices in 
r G  that do not appear in some proper subgame of 
r G .
Let N={1,...,n} be the set of players where n³2. Let Ai be the non-empty set of (behavior)
strategies of iÎN - each strategy assigns to each of i’s information sets a probability
distribution on the set of possible choices at that information set (and if i owns no information
set, Ai is defined to be a singleton). Define A=iÎNAi. For any ai, ai’ÎAi and mÎ[0,1], let
m·ai+(1-m)·ai’ be the strategy that at any given information set of player i with probability m
prescribes the same choice behavior as ai, and with probability 1-m the same choice behavior
as ai’. For any aiÎAi and rÎR, let ai(r) be the strategy that prescribes the same choices as ai,
except on the path to r where choices are made in accordance with that path. By the definition
of a subgame (see van Damme (1991)), ai(r) is uniquely defined. For any a=(ai)iÎNÎA and
rÎR, let Ai(r,a)ÍAi be the set of strategies that prescribe the same choices as the strategy ai at
all information sets outside the r-part of 
r G . That is, Ai(r,a) is the set of strategies i may use
if he behaves according to ai at information sets outside the r-part of 
r G , but is free to make
any choices in the r-part of 
r G . Note that Ai(r,a)¹Æ since ai(r)ÎAi(r,a). Note also that if no8
information sets of i’s appears in the r-part of 
r G , then Ai(r,ai)={ai(r)}. Define
A(r,a)=xiÎNAi(r,a).
Using the assignment of payoffs to endnodes, we can derive a payoff function for each player
which depends on what profile in A is played. Let pi: A®U denote this function. We shall
refer to pi as player i‘s material payoff function. We interpret material payoffs as representing
money, or some other objectively measurable quantity. However, the material payoff is not
the only payoff which we shall assume motivates i in his decision making. To get i’s utility,
which is the function that i wants to maximize, we shall add a reciprocity payoff to i’s
material payoff. We do this by rebuilding G as a psychological game in which the players
have explicitly specified beliefs about one another’s actions, and about one anothers beliefs
about one another’s actions.
We represent beliefs as behavior strategies. However, in order to avoid confusion, we
introduce separate notation for beliefs. Let Bij=Aj be the set of possible beliefs of player i
about the strategy of player j. Let Cijk=Bjk=Ak be the set of possible beliefs of player i about
a belief of player j about the strategy of player k. For any bijÎBij, cijkÎCijk, and rÎR, define
bij(r) and cijk(r) in a fashion completely analogous to that pertaining to strategies.
We wish to capture that each player j to some extent wants to be kind in return to any player i
who is kind to j. What does it mean for i to be kind to j? Suppose that i chooses ai Î Ai and
that he believes that all other players make choices according to the profile (bij)j¹iÎ´j¹iBij.
Following Rabin (1993), we note that player i then believes that he chooses in such a way
that j’s material payoff will be pj(ai,(bij)j¹i). He also believes that the feasible set of material
payoffs for j is {pj(ai’,(bij)j¹i)|ai’ÎAi}. How kind i is to j can now be measured in terms of
the relative size of pj(ai,(bij)j¹i) within this set.
While this measurement may be done in several ways, there is one particular aspect that must
handled carefully. Consider the following game G3 which is related to G2 in Figure 2:
(Insert Figure 3)9
Suppose 1 plays the strategy D, and suppose he believes with probability one that player 2 is
playing the strategy cd (any other belief will in fact also do to make our point). One sees that
1 believes he chooses the material payoff pj(D,cd)=0 for player 2, from the feasible set of
material payoffs for j which is [-1000,2]. Within this set, 0 is a rather large number. Should
one therefore conclude that player 1 is rather kind by choosing D? We would find this
unreasonable. The fact that W is a possible choice for 1 seems to be irrelevant for drawing
conclusions regarding the kindness of the choices C and D. The choice of W guarantees an
inefficient outcome which hurts both players. By contrast, each of the actions C and D may
lead to outcomes that are efficient in terms of material payoff allocations.
We propose that 1’s kindness if he chooses D in G3 should be the same as if 1 chooses D in
G2, if 1 has the same beliefs in the two cases. That is, 1’s kindness should be assessed with
reference to the relative position of p2(D,cd)=0 for player 2 in the set
[p2(D,cd), p2(C,cd)]=[0,2]. Since 0 is the lowest number in this set, player 1 should be
considered unkind if he chooses D.
In general, we proceed as follows. Define player i’s efficient strategies by
Ei = {aiÎAi| there exists no ai’ÎAi such that for all rÎR, (aj)j¹i´j¹iAj, kÎN it holds that 
pk(ai’(r),(aj(r))j¹i)³ pk(ai(r),(aj(r))j¹i), with strict inequality for some (r,(aj)j¹i,k)}
Intuitively, a strategy is inefficient if there exists another strategy which, conditional on any
history of play and subsequent choices by the others, provides no lower material payoff for
any player, and a higher material payoff for some player for some history of play and
subsequent choices by the others. For example, in G1 and G2 all strategies are efficient for
both players. In G3 all strategies are efficient, except those strategies of player 1 that assign
positive probability to the choice W.
In order to define how kind i is to j we expand on an idea of Rabin’s (1993): i’s kindness is
zero if he believes that j’s material payoff will be the average between respectively the lowest
and highest material payoff of j’s that is compatible with i choosing an efficient strategy.
16 It
                                               
16 In principle also other weighted averages could be used without any basic change of subsequent results.10
is convenient to have a special notation which describes this number as a function of i's
beliefs about the profile being played. We call this function p j
ei , defined by
p j
ei ((bij)j¹i) = ½ ×[max{pj(ai,(bij)j¹i)| aiÎEi} + min{pj(ai,(bij)j¹i)| aiÎEi}]
Think of p j
ei ((bij)j¹i) as a norm for i describing the “equitable” payoffs for player j when i's
beliefs about other players’ behavior are summarized by (bij)j¹i. We use p j
ei ((bij)j¹i) as a
reference point for measuring how kind i is to j. If i chooses a strategy ai such that
pj(ai,(bij)j¹i)=p j
ei ((bij)j¹i), then his kindness is zero. Otherwise i’s kindness to j is
proportional to how much more or less material payoff than p j
ei ((bij)j¹i) that i thinks will be
the consequence for j. More specifically:
Definition 1.  The kindness of player i to another player j¹ i is given by the function
kij: Ai´j¹iBij® U defined by
kij(ai,(bij)j¹i) = pj(ai,(bij)j¹i) - p j
ei ((bij)j¹i)
Intuitively, Definition 1 reflects the idea i’s kindness to j is proportional to “the size of his
gift”. There are many conceivable functional forms for kij that could capture this idea. All
examples in this paper, as well as analogues of the existence theorem in Section 5, work in
much the same way with many such functions. We discuss this further in the Remark after
the Theorem in Section 4, and also in Section 5 when we compare our model to that of Rabin
(1993). Definition 1 is easiest to apply though, so we now proceed using this formulation.
Having defined kindness, we now turn to reciprocity—the idea that if j is kind (unkind) to i,
then i wants to be kind in return (take revenge). Since j’s kindness depends on j's beliefs, i
cannot observe j’s kindness directly. However, i can consult his beliefs about j's actions and
beliefs and draw inferences concerning j’s kindness. We introduce a function liji to keep
track of how kind i believes that j is to i:
Definition 2.  Player i’s beliefs about how kind player j¹i is to i is given by the function
liji: Bij´k¹jCijk®U defined by
liji(bij,(cijk)k¹j) = pi(bij,(cijk)k¹j) - pi
ej ((cijk)k¹j)11
Note that since Bij=Aj and Cijk=Bjk, the function liji is formally equivalent to the function
kji although it captures a psychological component that pertains to player i, not player j.
It is now time to specify the utilities which the players are assumed to maximize:
Definition 3.  Player i’s utility is a function Ui: Ai´j¹i(Bij´ k¹jCijk)® U defined by
Ui(ai,(bij,(cijk)k¹j)j¹i) = pi(ai,(bij)j¹i) + Yi×SjÎN\{i} kij(ai,(bij)j¹i) × liji (bij,(cijk)k¹j),
where Yi is an exogenously given non-negative number.
Player i's utility is the sum of n terms. The first term is his material payoff, the remaining
terms express his reciprocity payoff with respect to each player j¹i. The constant Yi measures
how sensitive i is to reciprocity concerns. If Yi>0 the following is true: If i believes that j is
kind to him (i.e., liji(×)>0), then i's reciprocity payoff with respect to j is increasing in i's
kindness to j. Furthermore, the higher is liji(×), the more material payoff i is willing to give
up in order to do j a favour. If i believes that j is unkind to him (i.e., liji(×)<0), then i's
reciprocity payoff with respect to j is decresing in i's kindness to j. This is the way in which
Ui reflects the idea that if i thinks that j is kind (unkind) to him, then i wants to be kind in
return (take revenge). Of course, when i optimizes he may have to make tradeoffs between
various reciprocity payoffs with respect to different players as well as his material payoff.
The specification in Definition 3 has a particular feature to which we shall return later. To
facilitate reference, we now discuss this in a remark:
Remark.  We choose to work with utilities as given by Definition 3 because this is the
simplest formulation we can think of that invokes a concern for reciprocity. However, it is
important to note that Definition 3 has the specific drawback that U i will not represent i’s
preferences in a way which is invariant with respect to the choice of monetary units. To see
this, note that if i’s monetary payoff is measured in dollars, then the reciprocity payoff will
have the dimension of dollars squared! In principle this problem could be solved by defining
player i’s reciprocity payoff with respect to each player j as Yi times the square root of the
absolute value of kij(×)×liji(×), adjusted so as to maintain the right sign. If one wanted to
estimate a parameter like Yi based on experimental data for different games, it would12
probably be sensible to adopt such an approach. However, doing so greatly complicates the
calculation of examples, so in what follows we work with Definition 3, and imagine that Yi is
selected to adequately reflect i’s sensitivity to reciprocity concerns after the choice of
monetary unit has been made.
17
We can now append any extensive game G with a vector of utilities (Ui)iÎN defined as above
and get the tuple G*=(G, (Ui)iÎN). We refer to any G* constructed in this fashion as a
psychological game with reciprocal incentives. Note that such a G* is not a “game” in the
traditional sense, since the utility functions Ui are defined on domains that include subjective
beliefs, and not only strategic choices.
We propose a solution concept which is applicable to any psychological game with reciprocal
incentives. In the spirit of Rabin (1993), we look for equilibria in which each player chooses
an optimal strategy given his beliefs which furthermore are required to be correct. We also
wish to impose a requirement of sequential rationality in every subgame and make the
following assumptions: Suppose player i plays the strategy aiÎAi, initially believing the
others to play (bij)j¹i. In a subgame 
r G , we model player i as playing strategy ai(r)ÎAi,
believing the others to play (bij(r))j¹i. Of course, if r is the root of G, then ai(r)=ai and
(bij(r))j¹i=(bij)j¹i. In any 
r G  which is a proper subgame of G, players are assumed to be
motivated according to the beliefs they hold at r at all information sets that appear in the r-
part of 
r G .
Definition 4. The profile a*=(ai*) iÎN is a sequential reciprocity equilibrium (SRE) if for all
iÎN and for all rÎR it holds that
(1) ai*(r) argmax aiÎAi(r,a*) Ui(ai,(bij(r),(cijk(r))k¹j)j¹i))
(2) bij = aj*  for all  j¹i
(3) cijk = ak*  for all j¹i, k¹j
                                               
17 There are in fact many alternative ways to specify the utility function of Definition 3 so as to capture the basic
reciprocity properties we are after. All have their pros and cons. We discuss this further in the Remark following
the Theorem in Section 4, and in Section 5 when we compare our model to that of Rabin (1993).13
By condition (1) of Definition 4, a SRE is a strategy profile such that in the r-part of each
subgame 
r G  each player makes choices which maximizes his utility given his beliefs and
given that he follows his equilibrium strategy outside the r-part of 
r G . If 
r G =G, conditions
(2) and (3) guarantee that his initial beliefs are correct. At any subsequent subgame 
s G
condition (1) requires that beliefs assign probability one to the sequence of choices that allow
sÎR to be reached, but are otherwise as the initial beliefs.
3. APPLICATIONS
In this section we apply our model to two well known and experimentally tested games. This
serves the purpuse of showing how reciprocity motives shape the analysis. Furthermore, the
applications exemplify how to calculate sequential reciprocity equilibria.
a) The Sequential Prisoners' Dilemma
The first game we analyze is the Sequential Prisoners' Dilemma G2 of Figure 2,
18 which is a
very simplified version of the Fair Wage-Effort model.
We first analyze player 2's behavior, which is summarized by two observations:
Observation 1: If player 1 defects (chooses D), player 2 also defects in every SRE.
To see this, note that only the reciprocity payoff can conceivably make 2 choose c, as the
material payoff per se dictates a choice of d for 2. However, for any possible strategy of 2,
player 2 gets less when 1 chooses D than when he chooses C. Whatever 1 believes about 2’s
strategy, 1's choice of D is unkind, and hence 2 must believe that 1 is unkind. Hence, the
reciprocity payoff as well as the material payoff makes player 2 choose d.
                                               
18We restrict our attention to equilibria for reciprocity parameters Y 1 and Y2  that are generic such that the
conditions on those paramenters used for the characterisation of equilibria (see below) are never fulfilled with
equality.14
Observation 2: If player 1 cooperates, the following holds in all SRE:
a) If Y2 1 > , player 2 cooperates.
b) If Y2 05 < . , player 2 defects.








To see this, notice that if 1 cooperates, 2 can give 1 a material payoff of at least  1 -  and at
most 1, so the "equitable" payoff of 1 is zero. If 2 chooses cooperation, 1 receives 1.
Therefore, 2's kindness of cooperation is 1. Similarly, 2's kindness of  defection is -1. In order
to calculate how kind 2 believes 1 is after choosing C we have to specify 2's belief of 1’s
belief about 2’s choice after C.
19 Denote this by p". Then 2’s belief about how much payoff 1
intends to give to 2 by choosing C is  2 ) " 1 ( 1 " × - + × p p , and since 2's payoff resulting from 1's
choice of D would be zero,
20 2’s belief about 1's kindness from choosing C is
" 5 . 0 1 ) 0 2 ) " 1 ( 1 " ( 5 . 0 2 ) " 1 ( 1 " p p p p p × - = + × - + × - × - + × . This implies that when 1
cooperates and the second order belief is p", 2's utility of cooperation is given by
) " 5 . 0 1 ( 1 1 2 p Y × - × × + , whereas 2's utility of defection is  ) " 5 . 0 1 ( ) 1 ( 2 2 p Y × - × - × + . The
former is larger than the latter if  1 ) " 2 ( 2 > - p Y . In equilibrium, the second order belief must
be correct. Hence, if in equilibrium 2 cooperates, the condition must hold for  1 "= p .  This is
the case if Y2 1 > . On the other hand, if in equilibrium 2 defects, the condition must not hold
for 0 "= p . This implies that Y2 05 < . . For intermediate values of Y2 (. ) 05 1 2 << Y  neither
cooperation nor defection can be part of an equilibrium. In order to have a mixed equilibrium,
the utility of cooperation must be equal to the utility of defection. This is the case when
1 ) " 2 ( 2 = - p Y . Since in equilibrium the second order belief must be correct, the actual








                                               
19 In principle we also need 2's belief about 1's behavior. However, we must only care about beliefs that are in
accordance with reaching the node under consideration. After 1 has already choosen C, there is only one such
belief, namely 1 choosing C. To put it differently: 2 already knows what 1 has done, and 2's belief has to be in
accordance with her knowledge.
20 Recall that in any SRE player 2 defects after a defection of 1 (see Observation 1).15
Notice that the probability p=0 for Y2 05 = .,  a n d  p =1 for Y2 1 = . Hence, Observation 1 and 2
together imply that for a given parameter Y2 2's equilibrium behavior is unique. This is,
however, in general not true for 1's behavior that can be characterized by three observations:
Observation 3: If  Y2 05 < . , defection is 1's unique equilibrium behavior.
To see this, notice that for Y2 05 < .  player 2 always defects (see Observation 1 and 2). Hence,
only the reciprocity part of the utility function can make 1 choose C (the material payoff
alone would dictate for 1 to choose D). However, for any second order belief about 1's
behavior 2's strategy of always defecting is unkind. Hence, the reciprocity payoff as well as
the material payoff makes  player 1 choose D.
Observation 4: If Y2 1 > , 1's equilibrium behavior is characterized by one of the three
following possibilities:
a) Player 1 cooperates (regardless of  1 Y ).
b)Y1 1 >  and player 1 defects.










To see this, note that Y2 1 >  implies that 2 cooperates when 1 cooperates and defects when 1
defects (see Observation 1 and 2). Hence, 1 can give 2 a material payoff of at least 0 and at
most 1. Hence, the "equitable" payoff of 1 is 0.5. If 1 chooses cooperation, 2 receives 1.
Therefore, 1's kindness of cooperation is 0.5. Similarly, 1's kindness of  defection is -0.5. In
order to calculate how kind 1 believes that 2 is we have to specify 1's belief about what 2
believes that 1 will do. Denote by q” this second order belief of 1 choosing C. Then 1
believes that 2 believes that she gives player 1 a material payoff of  0 ) " 1 ( 1 " × - + × q q  by
choosing her equilibrium strategy. If 2 always cooperates, 1's payoff is  2 ) " 1 ( 1 " × - + × q q ,
whereas if 2 always defects, 1's payoff is  0 ) " 1 ( ) 1 ( " × - + - × q q . Hence, 1’s belief about 2's
kindness from choosing c after C and d after D is given by:
1 " 2 ) 0 ) " 1 ( ) 1 ( " 2 ) " 1 ( 1 " ( 5 . 0 0 ) " 1 ( 1 " - × = × - + - × + × - + × × - × - + × q q q q q q q . This implies that
when 2 plays the equilibrium strategy and the second order belief is q”, 1's utility of
cooperation is given by  ) 1 " 2 ( 5 . 0 1 1 - × × × + q Y , whereas 1's utility of defection is16
) 1 " 2 ( ) 5 . 0 ( 0 1 - × × - × + q Y . The former is larger than the latter if  0 ) 1 " 2 ( 1 1 > - × × + q Y . In
equilibrium, the second order belief must be correct. Hence, if in equilibrium 1 cooperates,
the condition must hold for  1 "= q , which is always the case.
On the other hand, if in equilibrium 1 defects, the condition must not hold for  0 "= q . This
implies that Y 1 1 > .
In order to have a mixed equilibrium, the utility of cooperation must be equal to the utility of
defection. This is the case when  0 ) 1 " 2 ( 1 1 = - × × + q Y . Since in equilibrium the second order
belief must be correct, the actual probability of cooperation, q, must be such that the










Observation 4a corresponds to the intuitively most plausible equilibrium — since 2 is using
strategy cd, 1’s material payoff as well as his reciprocity payoff leads him to cooperate. If,
however, reciprocity is important enough, there also exists other equilibria that are
characterized by “self-fulfilling prophecies”. If 1 believes that 2 initially believes that 1
chooses D, and that 2 defects in that case,  then 1 believes that 2 is unkind. This in turn leads
1 to be unkind, i.e. to play D (or to mix). Of course, such a mechanism only works when 1 is
motivated enough by reciprocity - if this is not the case, 1's material payoff together with the
reciprocal behavior of 2 make him cooperate.
Next we turn to the equilibrium behavior when 2 is moderately motivated by reciprocity and
hence answers a cooperative choice of 1 with mixing.





>   and player 1 cooperates.
b) YY 12 32 >-  and player 1 defects.
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when 1 cooperates, and 2 defects when 1 defects (see Observations 1 and 2). Hence, 1 can17
give 2 a material payoff of at least 0 and at most  ) 1 ( 2 1 p p - × + × . Hence, the "equitable"
payoff of 1 is 
2
2
)) 1 ( 2 ( 5 . 0
p
p p = - × + . If 1 chooses cooperation, 2 receives









. In order to calculate how kind 1 believes 2 is we have to specify 1's
belief about what 2 believes that 1 will do. Denote by q” this second order belief of 1
choosing C. Then 1 believes that 2 believes that she gives player 1 a material payoff of
0 ) " 1 ( )) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 ( " × - + - × - + × q p p q  by her equilibrium strategy. If 2 always cooperates, 1's
payoff is  2 ) " 1 ( 1 " × - + × q q , whereas if 2 always defects, 1's payoff is  0 ) " 1 ( ) 1 ( " × - + - × q q .
Hence, 1’s belief about 2’s kindness of her equilibrium strategy is
1 " 2 ) 0 ) " 1 ( ) 1 ( " 2 ) " 1 ( 1 " ( 5 . 0 0 ) " 1 ( )) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 ( " - = × - + - × + × × - + × - × - + - × - + × p q q q q q q p p q .
This implies that when 2 plays the equilibrium strategy and the second order belief is q", 1's
utility of cooperation is given by  ) 1 " 2 (
2
2
) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 - + - × - + p q
p
Y p p , whereas 1's utility of
defection is  ) 1 " 2 )(
2
2
( 0 1 - - + p q
p
Y . The former is larger than the latter if
0 ) 1 " 2 )( 2 ( 1 2 1 > - - + - p q p Y p . In equilibrium, the second order belief must be correct.
Hence, if in equilibrium 1 cooperates, the condition must hold for  1 "= q , which happens if
p > 05 . . This in turn implies that Y2
2
3
>  (see the calculation of p in Observation 2 c).
On the other hand, if in a SRE 1 defects, the condition must not hold for  0 "= q . Inserting for
p and rearranging terms this leads to  2 3 2 1 - > Y Y .
In order to have a mixed equilibrium, utility of cooperation must be equal to the utility of
defection. This is the case when  0 ) 1 " 2 )( 2 ( 1 2 1 = - - + - p q p Y p . Since in equilibrium the
second order belief must be correct, the actual probability of cooperation, q, must be such that
the condition is fulfilled. Substituting for p this implies that 







q . The other
conditions of Observation 5c are necessary to guarantee that q is larger than zero and smaller
than 1.
Like in Observation 4, the first of these cases is the intuitively plausible one — if 2
reciprocates with a high enough probability, 1 cooperates because of his material payoff as
well as because of  reciprocity reasons. If, however, reciprocity is important enough, there
also exists other equilibria that are characterized by self-fulfilling prophecies: If 1 believes
that 2 initially believes that 1 chooses D, and that 2 defects in that case, 1 expects an unkind
action of 2. This in turn leads 1 to be unkind, i.e. to play indeed D (or to mix). Of course, this18
mechanism only works when 1 is enough motivated by reciprocity — if this is not the case,
1's material interest together with the reciprocal behavior of 2 make him cooperate.
To summarize, SREs in the Sequential Prisoners Dilemma are characterized by the fact that -
depending on 2's reciprocity inclination - the equilibrium behavior of player 2 is unique. If
confronted with defection 2 also defects. If 1 cooperates, 2 defects when the psychological
payoff plays only a little role for him, she cooperates when she is very motivated by
reciprocity considerations, and she plays a mixed strategy for intermediate levels of her
reciprocity parameter. Player 1's equilibrium behavior is only unique when 2 always defects.
In this case, he also defects irrespectively of his own type. If, however, 2 reciprocates with a
high enough probability then there exists a SRE where hhe cooperates irrespectively of his
own type. But besides of that there also exists two self-fulfilling prophecy equilibria when the
impact of reciprocity considerations on 1 is large enough. These self-fulfilling prophecy
equilibria are characterized by a mutual distrust and hence noncoopertion.
b) The Ultimatum Game
The next game we analyse is the Ultimatum Game. In this game a monetary “pie” of c units
of money has to be divided between two persons. Player 1 offers player 2 an integer amount x
between zero and c. Hence, player 1's strategy set is given by {0,1,...,c-1,c}. Player 2 may
either accept (A) or reject (R) the offer. Hence, a pure strategy of 2 is a function from the set
of possible offers into {A,R}. If the responder accepts the offer, she gets the offered amount
and the proposer the rest. In case of rejection, both get nothing. Hence, as long as player 2 is
only motivated by her material payoff, i.e. by the money she gets, she should accept every
positive offer. Knowing that, a purely "materialistic" proposer should offer zero (or one
monetary unit) in any subgame perfect equilibrium.
In order to characterize the sequential reciprocity equilibria,
21 notice first that in every SRE
player 2 will accept the highest possible offer of x=c. In case of such an offer, player 1 gets
                                               
21 In this application we restrict our attention to pure strategy equilibria. Furthermore, like in the previous
application we characterize the equilibria only for reciprocity parameters Y 1 and Y2  that are generic such that19
zero irrespectively of  2's decision. Hence, 2 can neither be kind nor unkind to 1, and hence
only the material payoff matters in that case. Therefore, 2 accepts an offer of c. On the other
hand, 1 can always guarantee that 2 earns nothing (by offering zero). Hence, in any
equilibrium 2's equitable payoff p 2
1 e  used for the calculation of 1's kindness k12(×) or 2’s
belief of  1’s kindness  ) ( 212 × l  (see Definitions 1 and 2) is c/2. Furthermore, notice that each
strategy of 2 which involves rejecting any offer is not efficient. Hence, 2 has only one
efficient strategy, namely accepting every possible offer, and 1's payoff from 2's efficient
strategy is (c-x). Therefore, 1's equitable payoff for any possible offer x is (c-x). Hence, in
case 1 makes an offer that is rejected by 2, 2's kindness equals 0-(c-x)=-(c-x), whereas in case
of acceptance 2's kindness is zero.
We now turn to the behavior of player 2. It can be characterized by three observations.








To see this, assume to the contrary that there exists a SRE where such a high offer would be
rejected. Since beliefs are correct in equilibrium, this requires that 2 believes that 1 believes
that his offer will be rejected. Hence, for all second order beliefs that are consistent with
rejecting the offer, the 2’s belief in 1’s kindness, l212(×), equals -c/2. Recall that 2's kindness
from rejection is -(c-x), and from acceptance is zero. Therefore, 2's utility from a deviation to
acceptance is given by  x c Y x = - × × + ) 2 / ( 0 2 , whereas rejection gives 2 a utility of
) 2 / )( ( 0




, the former is higher than the latter.
Therefore, to maximize her utility 2 should deviate to acceptance - a contradiction.
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To see this, assume to the contrary that there exists a SRE such that such a small offer would
be accepted. In equilibrium beliefs are correct, which requires that 2 believes that 1 believes
that his offer will be accepted. Hence, for all second order beliefs that are consistent with
                                                                                                                                                 
the conditions on those paramenters used for the characterisation of equilibria (see below) are never fulfilled
with equality.20
accepting the offer in equilibrium, 2’s belief in 1’s kindness, l212(×), equals x-c/2. Recall that
2's kindness from rejection is -- () cx , and from acceptance is zero. Therefore, 2's utility
from accepting is given by  x c x Y x = - × × + ) 2 / ( 0 2 , whereas deviating to rejection gives 2 a
utility of   ) 2 / )( ( 0
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, the latter
utility is higher than the former. Therefore, the 2 should deviate to rejection - a contradiction.
One can show that the boundary value for rejection in Observation 1 is larger than the
boundary value for acceptance in Observation 2
22. Hence, there exists an intermediate range
of offers where the 2's reaction is not yet characterized. We do this in
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 is part of an SRE.
To see this, assume that 2 accepts in equilibrium. Correctness of beliefs requires that 2
believes that 1 believes that his offer will be accepted. Hence, for all second order beliefs that
are consistent with accepting the offer, the 2’s belief in 1’s kindness 2, l212(×), equals x-c/2.
Recall that 2's kindness from rejection is -(c-x), and from acceptance is zero. Therefore, 2's
utility from accepting is given by  x c x Y x = - × × + ) 2 / ( 0 2 , whereas deviating to rejection
would give 2 a utility of   ) 2 / )( ( 0
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, the former utility is higher than the latter. Therefore,
acceptance is indeed a best reponse.
                                               
22 This can be most easily seen by transforming the conditions in Observations 1 and 2 to be conditions on Y2.21
Now assume that in equilibrium 2 rejects the same offer x. Correctness of beliefs requires that
2 believes that 1 believes that his offer will be rejected. Hence, for all second order beliefs
that are consistent with rejecting the offer, the 2’s belief in 1’s kindness, l212(×), equals -c/2.
Recall that 2's kindness from rejection is -(c-x), and from acceptance is zero. Therefore, 2's
utility from a deviation to acceptance is given by  ) 2 / ( 0 2 c Y x - × × + , whereas rejection gives 2
a utility of   ) 2 / )( ( 0




, the latter is larger than the
former. Therefore, rejection is also a best reponse.
This intermediate range of offers is characterized by self-fulfilling prophecies. Suppose  the
beliefs are such that the offer is rejected, which makes the offer a very unkind action of 1 (2's
expected  material payoff is zero). This in turn leads 2 to be unkind to 1, and the only way she
can do so is by rejecting the offer. On the other hand, if the beliefs imply acceptance of the
offer, the offer is not so unkind  (since in case of acceptance 2's material payoff is x), and
hence 2 does not opt for the unkind action - 2 accepts. Because of these selfullfilling
prophecies the SRE of this game is not unique even for generic material payoffs.
Notice further that if Y2 converges to zero, the boundary value for 2 to accept in Observation
1 converges to zero - 2's SRE-behavior converges to the responder's subgame perfect
equilibrium behavior in the game without reciprocity considerations.
We now turn to the behavior of the proposer which is characterized by the two observations:
Observation 4: For allYY 12 ,  there exists an SRE such that 1 makes the lowest offer that is
acceptable for 2 (according to 2's equilibrium strategy).
To see this, assume that 1 makes the lowest acceptable offer and that this is part of an SRE.
Correctness of beliefs requires that 1 believes that 2  will accept it. Hence 1 believes that 2's
kindness is zero (recall that 2 can never be kind, only unkind or "neutral" to 1). Therefore, 1's
reciprocity payoff is zero irrespectively of what he does, and hence only the material payoff
shapes 1's decision. 1’s material payoff is of course largest if 1 makes the lowest acceptable
offer. Hence, such an offer maximizes 1's utility.
Observation 5: If the reciprocity parameters of both players are large enough, then there
exists a SRE where 1 makes an offer that is not accepted by 2.22
Notice first that if Y2 is large enough, it follows from Observation 2 there exists offers that
will be rejected for sure. Now assume that in equilibrium 1 makes such an offer, denoted by
x. Since in equilibrium beliefs are correct, 1’s belief in 2's kindness, l121(×), is –c+x.
Furthermore, 1's kindness from an unacceptable offer is given by -c/2 (since 2's material
payoff is zero and the equitable payoff, as already noted, is c/2). Hence, 1's utility from
making the unacceptable offer is  2 / ) ( 0 2 c x c Y - + . Deviating to another unacceptable offer
does not change 1's utility: each player's material payoff remains the same, hence 1's kindness
does not change, and a deviation never changes the kindness expected from the other player.
On the other hand, a deviation to an acceptable offer changes 1's utility. Since 2's kindness is
never positive, 1 will never make an acceptable offer higher than the lowest acceptable offer
that we denote by  x. If  1 offers  x, his kindness changes to  2 / c x - . Hence, if 1 deviates







> , this utility from deviating is lower than the utility of the equilibrium offer x.
To summarize, in each SRE the responder accepts high offers and rejects low offers. Due to
self-fulfilling prophecies, acceptance as well as rejection is part of SREs for intermediate
offers. For all possible parameter values there exists SREs such that the proposer makes the
lowest offer acceptable for the responder. Furthermore, if reciprocity is important enough
there exists equilibria that are characterized by rejected offers. In these equilibria players hold
beliefs that make them view one another as unkind, which in turn leads the players to be
unkind in return.
4. EXISTENCE
THEOREM. There exists a SRE in every psychological game with reciprocal incentives.
Proof.  The idea of the proof is to construct a particular profile aÎA which turns out to be a
SRE. Consider a subgame 
r G  that has zero depth. For each iÎN define a correspondence bi
r:
A®Ai by bi
r(a)=argmax ai’ÎAi Ui(ai’(r),(aj(r),(ak(r))k¹j)j¹i)). Note two things (i) and (ii):
(i) By standard arguments one sees that the combined correspondence b
r: A®A defined by23
b
r(a)=(bi
r(a))iÎN admits a fixpoint.
23 (ii) By inspection of bi
r one sees that if ai’Îbi
r(a) and
if ai’’ÎAi prescribes the same choices as ai’ at all information sets in 
r G , then it must hold
that ai’’Îbi
r(a). Combining (i) and (ii) one infers that there exist some profile a such that for
any 
r G  with rÎR that has zero depth it holds that aÎb
r(a). Pick any such profile and call it
a0=(ai0)iÎN.
If G itself has zero depth, set a=a0. Else, let x>0 be the lowest number such that there exists
some subgame with depth x. Consider a subgame 
s G  that has depth x. For each iÎN define
the correspondence bi
s: A(s,a0)®Ai(s,a0) by bi
s(a)=argmax ai’ÎAi(s,a0) Ui(ai’,(aij(s),
(aijk(s))k¹j)j¹i)). Note two things (iii) and (iv): (iii) By standard arguments one sees that the
combined correspondence b
s: A(s,a0)®A(s,a0) defined by b
s(a)=(bi
s(a))iÎN admits a
fixpoint. (iv) By inspection of bi
s one sees that if ai’Îbi
s(a) and if ai’’ÎAi prescribes the
same choices as ai’ at all information sets inside 
s G , then it must hold that ai’’Îbi
s(a).
Combining (iii) and (iv) one infers that there exist some profile a such that for any subgame
s G  that has a depth of x it holds that aÎb
s(a). Pick any such profile and call it ax=(aix)iÎN
If K itself has depth x, set a=ax. Else, proceed backwards through the tree in an analogous
fashion (let y be the lowest number such that there exists some subgame that has depth y>x;
consider a subgame that has depth y; et cetera) until G itself is considered and it is inferred
that there exist some profile aÎA such that aÎbi
t(a), where t is the root of G. Pick any such
profile and call it a.
It is easy to see that a so defined must be a SRE. This is because in the above construction of
a, the choices assigned to information sets in the r-part of any subgame 
r G  were selected so
as to maximize the respective players’ utilities given the choices assigned to information sets
succeeding the r-part of 
r G , and what choices are assigned to information sets preceeding the
r-part of 
r G  is irrelevant for the determination of optimal choices in the r-part of 
r G . ￿
                                               
23 Since Ai is non-empty (recall that if i owns no information set then Ai is taken to be singleton) and compact
and Ui is continuous (as pi, kij, and liji are all continuous) bi
r is non-empty, closed-valued, and upper-hemi
continuous by Berge's maximum principle. Since Ai is convex and Ui is quasi-concave (in fact linear) in i's own
strategy, bi
r must furthermore be convex-valued. Hence Kakutani's fixed point theorem can be applied to b
r.24
Remark. Analogous theorems go through also with alternative definitions of the utilities, as
long as these are quasiconcave in each player’s own strategy. For example, this is the case
with the formulation mentioned in Remark of Section 2 where each player i’s reciprocity
payoff with respect to each player j is Yi times the square root of the absolute value of
kij(×)×liji (×), adjusted so as to maintain the right sign. Then each players reciprocity payoff is
concave in the his strategy, and so is the utility. Another possibility is to leave the appearance
of Definition 3 intact, but to modify Definitions 1 and 2 and redefine kij and liji as follows:
kij(ai,(bij)j¹i) =  [pj(ai,(bij)j¹i) - p j
ei ((bij)j¹i)] /
 [ Q + max{pj(ai,(bij)j¹i)| aiÎAi} - min{pj(ai,(bij)j¹i)| aiÎAi}]
liji(bij,(cijk)k¹j) =  [pi(bij,(cijk)k¹j)-pi
ej ((cijk)k¹j)] /
[Q+max{pi(bij,(cijk)k¹j)|bijÎBij}-min{pi(bij,(cijk)k¹j)|bijÎBij}]
where Q is a positive constant. This specification is similar to Rabin’s (1993) formulation.
We discuss this further in the next section.
5. COMPARISON WITH RABIN (1993)
Rabin (1993) develops a theory of reciprocity for normal form games with two players. In
most two-player extensive games that lack proper subgames our model generates predictions
that are similar to those that would obtain if Rabin’s (1993) model was applied to the normal
form of any such extensive game. Hence, if we rewrite the normal form games analyzed in
Rabin’s paper as simultaneous move extensive games we get qualitatively similar
conclusions as he does in almost all cases. This indicates that the main difference between
our model and that of Rabin (1993) is the requirement of sequential reciprocity we impose in
games with an interesting dynamic structure. Yet the two models are different also in some25
other ways. In this section we review these differences and attempt to justify our modeling
choices.
If we were to make the following three changes to our model, then if we applied it to any
two-player extensive game that has no proper subgames we would get exactly the same
solutions as does Rabin in the normal form of that game:
Change (i). Substitute (1+kij(ai,(bij)j¹i)) for kij(ai,(bij)j¹i) in Definition 3.
Change (ii). Use the kij and liji functions discussed in the Remark of Section 4, except that
Q=0 and that these function take a zero value if the respective denominators are zero.
Change (iii). Redefine the notion of an efficient strategy such that aiÎAi is an efficient
strategy given beliefs (bij)j¹i if there exists no ai’ÎAi such that for all rÎR, and kÎN it holds
that pk(ai’(r),(bij(r))j¹i)³ pk(ai(r),(bij(r))j¹i), with strict inequality for some (r, k).
Change (i) incorporates an additional motivational element which Rabin (1993, p. 1287)
argues is realistic. However, for the sake of simplicity we avoid it. In principle Change (i) can
be applied to our model without adverse consequences, and we will not discuss this any
further here. Change (ii) represents a kind of normalization of the players kindness such that
the reciprocity payoff will have zero dimension. By contrast we measure kindness in the
same unit as the material payoffs (for example dollars). Change (iii) makes the definition of
an efficient strategy dependent on what is a players belief, whereas according to our
definition efficiency is a belief-independent property.
Changes (ii) and (iii) are problematic in the context of general extensive games. To argue this
point, consider the following example G4:
(Insert Figure 4)
Assume first that only Change (ii) is made in our theory. Suppose that in equilibrium it holds
that  a2=b12=p×f+(1-p)×d with p<1. A direct calculation involving the relevant function26
outlined in Change (ii) shows that 1’s kindness is (2×(1-p)-½×(2×(1-p)+0))/(2×(1-p)-0)=½. If Y2
is high enough, 2 must choose f, which is a contradiction. Suppose instead that a2=b12=f.
Player 1’s kindness is now zero, so 2 must choose d. Again this is a contradiction. This
proves that invoking (ii) in our theory would would preclude an existence theorem like that in
Section 4.
Note that the culprit here is the discontinuity exhibited by player 1’s kindness function as
p®1. In fact, for all values of p<1, given change (ii), 1’s kindness is constant (=½). We find
this feature unreasonable, since the higher is p the more likely 1 figures it to be that 2 chooses
f (since in equilibrium b12=p×f+(1-p)×d), and the less material payoff 1 then believes that he
gives to 2. We find it natural that 1’s kindness in equilibrium is decreasing in p, as is the case
in our theory (with b12=p×f+(1-p)×d, 1’s kindness if he chooses F is (1-p)).
Also Change (iii) would lead to existence problems. To see this, consider again G4, and
assume that only Change (iii) is made in our theory. Suppose that in equilibrium it holds that
a2=b12=pf+(1-p)d with p³½. Given Change (iii), only F is an efficient strategy for 1.
24
Hence 1 is not kind when choosing F. But then 2 chooses d, which is a contradiction.
Suppose instead that a2=b12=pf+(1-p)d with p<½. Then all 1’s strategies are efficient. Player
1 is now kind choosing F, and since p<½ his kindness is bounded away from zero. If Y2 is
high enough 2 must choose f, which again is a contradiction. This proves that invoking (iii) in
our theory leads to non-existence of equilibria in some games. Note that in our theory this
problem does not arise because efficiency of a strategy is a belief-independent property.
According to our definition, in G4 there are no inefficient strategies regardless of b12.
A final difference between our model and Rabin’s is that our theory applies also to games
with more than two players. We close this section by analyzing G5, a modified version of a
three-player game which Nalebuff & Stiglitz (1988) use to discuss certain aspects of
vengefulness.
                                               
24 Rabin (1993) does not give an explicit definition of an efficient strategy. Our argument here presumes a
definition corresponding to Change (iii), so that a strategy is efficient if no other strategy is at least as no worse
for any player, and better for some player. Alternatively a strategy may be defined as efficient if no other
strategy is strictly better for all players. It is easy to verify that also then can G4 be used to illustrate non-
existence.27
(Insert Figure 5 here)
With e=0, G5 may be thought of as a model of a strategic situation in which a $4-pie is to be
divided between three players. First player 1 has to choose which one of the other two players
must get a zero payoff. Then the player who was “unfavorably” treated by 1 is called upon to
decide which one of the other two will get which of the two positive monetary payoffs.
Intuition may suggest that player 1 is a priori worst off of the three. Whoever he treats
unfavourably will feel badly treated, and hence take revenge on 1 by awarding him the lowest
possible monetary payoff. Effectively, player 1 will get a payoff of one, while players 2 and 3
look at expected payoffs of 1.5.
If each player was motivated solely by his or her own monetary income this outcome would
not be guaranteed (in subgame perfect equilibrium), as players 2 and 3 would be indifferent
between all their choices. In order to accommodate revenge, Nalebuff & Stiglitz append the
usual selfishness assumption, and assume that the players have lexicographically ordered
objectives. Each player primarily maximizes his monetary rewards, but in case many choices
yield exactly the same monetary payoff ties are broken so as to allow a player to take
revenge. In G5, this works to 1’s disadvantage.
Our model of sequential reciprocity allows a similar conclusion, evoking also certain
emotions on behalf of player 1. This is true also when 2 and 3 incur some monetary cost e>0
if they “punish” player 1. For any e³0, at 2’s decision node 2 believes that 1 is unkind to 2
(l121(×)<0), and that 3 is neither kind nor unkind to 2 (l323(×)=0). Player 2 can get a positive
reciprocity payoff only by choosing r2, since k21(r2,×)<0< k21(l2,×). For large enough Y2
player 2 will choose r2 as her material cost is swamped by the sweetness of revenge.
Analogous remarks apply at player 3’s node, so in any sequential reciprocity it is true that if
Y2, Y2 are high enough, then a2=r2 and a3=r3. Yet, there are multiple equilibria which are
characterized by “self-fulfilling prophecies” much like in the examples of Section 3. Both the
pure strategy profiles (L,r2,r3) and (R,r2,r3) are equilibria (and with Y2>0 the only remaining28
equilibrium is (½·L+½·R,r2,r3)). The following calculations for player 1 confirm this for
(L,r2,r3):
k12(L  ,(r2,r3)) =  k13(R ,(r2,r3)) = -1.5;
k13(L ,(r2,r3)) = k12(R ,(r2,r3)) = 1.5;
l121(r2 ,(L,r3)) = -1; l131(r3 ,(L,r2)) = 0
Hence, it holds that
u1(L ,(r2,r3)) = 1+Y1×[(-1.5)×(-1)+ (1.5)×0)] < 1+Y1×[(1.5)×(-1)+ (-1.5)×0)] = u1(R ,(r2,r3)),
which shows that (L,r2,r3) is indeed a SRE.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we focus on modeling a concern for reciprocity, and disregard distributional
concerns like altruism, equity, and envy. As noted in the Introduction, it is clear that this
omission is not innocuous. For example, in experimental Dictator games individuals often
give away lots of money (see Davis & Holt 1993, pp 263-269 for a discussion), something
which cannot be explained by the model we propose in this paper. In reality people seem to
be motivated in many different ways, and perhaps this all depends not only on the strategic
nature of a situation but also on other aspects of the context where the situation occurs. For
example, in the case of Dictator games the evidence reported by Hoffman, McCabe & Smith
(1996) suggests that “social distance” is important in that context. We leave for future
research the delicate tasks of integrating multiple concerns in one unified model, and of
determining percisely in what context one or another motivational concern is of particular
importance. However, it seems clear that when these issues are tackled, experimental and
theoretical work should go hand in hand.29
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